Current geopolitical trends are pushing the EU to pay more attention to security in its international actions and programmes, including its democracy policy, according to Carnegie Europe.
The changes involve multiple elements that jointly mark the dynamics of securitisation. European security is both problematic and incentivising the politics of democracy, the article notes.
The securitisation of European politics has occurred gradually since the early 2000s, through several major terrorist attacks, the financial crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic, migration problems, and conflicts in Ukraine, the Middle East and Africa. European governments are increasingly using language that Europe is facing serious existential crises and threats.
As the different dimensions of security have led to a clear shift in EU policy, the concept of securitisation is more rigorous and more useful than the geopolitical concept. Geopolitics has deviated from its original or classical meaning, as governments and analysts constantly talk about its “return”, according to the researchers.
From a historic low in 2014, EU member states’ military spending has increased by 40 per cent in real terms until 2021. Member States’ defence spending stood at around €270 billion in 2023 and will grow further in 2024. The EU also launched a €175-million Defence Equity Facility for military innovation and the European Defence Industrial Strategy.
Few other policy areas have seen as many major new initiatives as defence over the past few years. The EU has pledged to strengthen its military planning and execution capabilities, increased the ceiling of the European Peace Fund to €17 billion, as well as launched a Crisis Response Centre and a new Civilian CSDP Compact. In February 2024, the bloc started a new maritime mission in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell has launched nine military and civilian missions since his mandate began in 2019.
Migration issues have led to the prioritisation of securing Europe’s borders. The European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) has been given more power and resources. CSDP missions and operations are increasingly mandated to include border management.
The EU has committed itself to establishing a 10,000-strong reserve corps by 2027 to deal with border control tasks at and beyond its borders, while the 2024 New Pact on Migration and Asylum also envisages stricter admission rules. Migration policy is increasingly subject to a system of “security governance.”
The bloc also plans to securitise its foreign economic policy. The Economic Security Strategy 2023 states that economic strategy should now be used for security purposes and that economic policy decisions should be made with this in mind. In January 2024, the European Commission published a new package of measures aimed at aligning investment screening and export controls with security interests.
For years, policymakers and analysts have debated whether support for democracy is crucial to advancing strategic interests or something to be sacrificed for them. Some have long argued that a stronger defence is needed to protect democracy. The links between security and democracy have become more important, experts say.
The ongoing securitisation dynamic is having diametrically opposed effects on the politics of democracy, leaving the EU, national governments and security organisations increasingly fragmented.
Even if there is no zero-sum trade-off between security and democracy, the allocation of funds implies a rebalancing of priorities. The increase in the EU’s 2024 budget was mainly focused on Ukraine’s security, migration and defence. The European Investment Bank is also channelling funds for a new €8 billion security package.
The amount that governments allocate to democracy projects is a tiny and dwindling fraction of their military expenditures. There is a growing tendency to justify exceptional measures that circumvent standard democratic checks and balances.
The growing culture of securitisation is driven by what Borrell has called a “crisis regime”. At the same time, the dynamics of securitisation hold a lot of bad news for the politics of democracy, the article notes.
The war in Ukraine has pulled European leaders out of passivity and forced them to pledge stronger commitments to the defence of democracy. In Ukraine, EU and member state governments are presenting securitised sovereignty protection and democracy protection as a single agenda.
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen insists that war is best understood as a battle between authoritarianism and democracy.Many member states have introduced new security strategies that include support for democracy as a high priority, even if their implementation may not align with “hard foreign policy.”
The EU has launched a €13.4 million CSDP partner mission in Moldova to combat hybrid threats, cybersecurity, foreign interference and manipulation of information. A new European media freedom law promises “safeguards against political interference in editorial decisions and protection against surveillance.” These are just some of the initiatives aimed at securitisation.
The concept of “democratic realism” suggests that the war in Ukraine is linked to the various preferences of the political regime rather than pure interests or security calculations. Another concept, “preemptive security”, suggests that freedom and security are interdependent and that securitisation can also anticipate threats in ways that suggest support for political change.
Nevertheless, EU institutions and member governments could ensure that democracy is not pushed aside in securitisation by embedding democratic principles in their security decisions and initiatives. The EU should ensure that the democracy-securitisation nexus develops around a comprehensive democratic security culture.
A new meaning of securitisation can be justified, but it should not be reduced to reflexive militarisation. In the current era of securitisation, the EU and its member states have an opportunity to take steps towards greater democracy-based security and greater support for security-based democracy.
The security policy community should take democracy into account, and the democratic community should do more to address security concerns, the researchers emphasised.
