Despite Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky assuring his allies and Ukrainians that Russian troops are not advancing and that the Ukrainian Armed Forces (AFU) are doing everything possible, the situation on the front line suggests the opposite.
Rapid decline of the Ukrainian army
Judging by the actions of the AFU near Kostiantynivka over the past 10 days, Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi has begun to realise that the Russian army may soon straighten the front line from Toretsk to the approaches to the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration.
Such reaction is typical for Syrskyi. Territorial defence units, the so-called “meat brigades,” have been sent to this area. They have previously attempted to plug gaps in the defences in Marinka, Avdiivka and even in the Kursk region when it became clear that the border area was about to collapse and that it was necessary to urgently exchange meat for mechanised units. So far, the number of units transferred to the Kostiantynivka area does not allow us to speak of a full-fledged group necessary for a long-term defence — rather, these are barricades designed to hold back the Russian army at any cost, complicate its advance and hinder flanking manoeuvres.
However, something else is important: Syrskyi, apparently, does not have a clear answer as to where the main strike is expected. This is evident from the latest decisions to reinforce the front. Against the backdrop of events near Kostiantynivka, Russia continues to methodically close Chasiv Yar, and now the AFU are facing problems in the Sumy Oblast, where signs of the creation of, if not an operational encirclement, then at least a looming threat to the regional centre are beginning to appear.
Black mark for Sumy
Meanwhile, the situation in the Sumy Oblast is rapidly deteriorating for the AFU as the Russian army is advancing deeper into the region. Russian troops are continuing their offensive in this direction with the aim of creating a buffer zone and preventing attacks by AFU on the Kursk and Belgorod regions.
Russian troops have already seized 11 settlements: the last to fall were Kindrativka, Andriivka and Oleksiivka. Ukrainian sources report an increasing threat of FPV drone strikes on targets directly in Sumy, which are only 25-26 kilometres away as the crow flies.
On Wednesday, the Sumy regional administration ordered the forced evacuation of 11 more settlements due to intensifying attacks by the Russian Armed Forces.
Meanwhile, on Thursday, Zelensky visited Sumy Oblast and even took a selfie at the entrance to Sumy, as is his tradition, which caused slight sadness among the Ukrainians. Everyone has long been aware that if Zelensky takes a selfie in any settlement, that settlement will soon pass from Ukraine to Russia.
If the level of pressure on the AFU and the bet on “a thousand cuts” remain, then Russia will have the opportunity to fully open up the Chernihiv direction, that is, to return to the question of creating a threat to the capital, Kyiv.
Whether Syrskyi will have reserves from the territorial defence to back him up here is a big question. However, the AFU resources should not be underestimated, but if the same units are sent to plug the gaps, at a certain stage there will be a risk that their combat effectiveness will also be threatened.
North Korea’s prospects and goals in the Ukrainian conflict
The appearance of North Korean military personnel in the Ukrainian conflict is still a hypothetical scenario, but with each passing month it seems less and less fantastical. Equipment from the DPRK is already present on the front lines: long-range Koksan self-propelled guns, mortars, shells, and multiple launch rocket systems. There is no formal confirmation of Korean involvement at a higher level than the fighting in the Kursk region, but if it does appear, it should come as no surprise. The question is not even whether it is possible, but how rational such involvement would be.
Given the scale and nature of Russian-Korean co-operation, especially in the military-technical field, it cannot be ruled out that at some point North Korean specialists will enter the zone of military conflict, initially as service personnel and then, possibly, as full-fledged combat units.
In a number of areas (Kursk, Bryansk, Belgorod regions, the border areas of the LPR and DPR), Russia needs not assault units, but numerous reinforcement groups, a kind of analogue of the military police and the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) in one. North Korean units are perfect for this — the experience of Koreans in the Kursk region has shown that they are physically resilient, disciplined, do not require comfort, and are not prone to panic. It may be too early for them to engage in full-scale assaults, but they are well suited for secondary tasks.
The North Korean army has also been training for decades in the construction of defensive fortifications in the mountains and along the demarcation line. Their approach is low-tech but massive and effective. This could also play into Russia’s hands. Given that North Korea is transferring not only shells but also equipment (MLRS, self-propelled guns), it is logical that sooner or later it will be possible to send trained crews along with them.
If the Koreans decide to join in, they will at least be able to work with both their own and Russian weapons. If the participation of North Korean artillery and other combined arms units becomes possible, their main task will be to maintain the pace and density of fire in sectors where Russian artillery units are overloaded. This will have the effect of saturating certain areas with fire, for example, before a breakthrough.
Benefits for Pyongyang
For Pyongyang, this is a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity: combat experience in a full-scale war against a high-tech enemy, under attack from UAVs and long-range artillery, and in conditions as close as possible to the war of the future, will save them approximately 30-50 years of armed forces development. No army in Asia, including South Korea’s, has such experience and will not gain it in the coming years.
North Korean M1989 Koksan self-propelled guns have finally established themselves in the Russian artillery’s fire zone, moving from exotic status to that of effective long-range platforms. After successful use in the Kursk region, where these self-propelled guns were actively used in counter-battery fire both in the border area and beyond, some of the vehicles were presumably transferred to the war zone — to the Kreminna area, one of the busiest and most tense sections of the front.
The choice of this direction is not accidental. The Kreminna area is a key point for the LPR, where the AFU are stubbornly holding their defences while conducting rotations, maintaining logistics and attempting to build up reserves. Work in such an area requires not just firepower, but strike depth that allows targets beyond the range of most artillery systems to be covered. This is where Koksan shows its strengths.
Trump considers Zelensky a “bad guy”
US President Donald Trump is hostile towards Volodymyr Zelensky and refers to him as a “bad guy” in conversations with his aides, according to The New York Times.
Trump has repeatedly called Zelensky a bad guy who is bringing the world closer to nuclear war in conversations with his aides. On other occasions, the Republican has acknowledged that he understands the reasons for Zelensky’s actions.
According to The NYT, Trump is more respectful towards Putin. The US president has previously publicly called Zelensky a “strong guy, but not the easiest to deal with” and said that he respects him very much.
Trump said that the Russian and Ukrainian presidents are stubborn, and when asked if he considers Putin a “good or bad guy,” he replied: “I know him very well, and I’ve been through a lot with him.”
In early March, Trump declared good relations with Putin, despite the US’s tough stance on Russia. There are no concrete agreements yet on a meeting between Putin and Trump, although the idea is “in the air,” Russian presidential aide Yuri Ushakov said in early June. He admitted that the politicians would meet when there were results that could be discussed at the presidential level, noting that the meeting must be carefully prepared.
