The UK, Russia, the US and Ukraine signed the Budapest Memorandum on December 5, 1994. Kyiv claims that the memorandum guaranteed Ukrainian security in return for the country’s renunciation of nuclear weapons. What did the document actually say and who could actually give Ukraine real security guarantees?
Budapest Memorandum 30 years later
On Tuesday, ahead of the 30th anniversary of the signing of the Budapest Memorandum, the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry said that Ukraine was not satisfied with the guarantees provided by the memorandum and therefore demanded credible guarantees in the form of NATO membership and no other alternatives would be considered.
What were these guarantees, which, according to Kyiv, were given to them jointly by Russia, Washington and London 30 years ago – and in exchange for what exactly?
After the collapse of the USSR, the “zero option” was adopted, under which the units and formations of the USSR Armed Forces located on the territory of the former Soviet republics were transferred to their subordination. The former Ukrainian SSR received a completely incongruous troop grouping, the number of which could not even be accurately determined.
On the territory of a country of 52 million people there were based troops with a total number of 680 to 980 thousand people (from 1.3 to 1.88 per cent with the conventional maximum of the peacetime army of 1 per cent of the population). Difficulties with the calculation were explained by the uncertainty at the time about the status of the Black Sea Fleet and the withdrawal of troops from Eastern Europe to Ukraine (some were in transit to other regions of the former USSR).
Among other things, Ukraine received part of the Soviet nuclear potential – the 43rd Army of the Strategic Missile Forces armed with 176 intercontinental ballistic missiles, 38 strategic bombers the Tupolev Tu-95 and Tu-160, in total – up to 4.4 thousand nuclear charges of various purposes. Formally, they were placed at the disposal of the command of the CIS Armed Forces.
De facto, Ukraine could not use this arsenal. There were no control and target designation systems (they were all closed to Moscow), no maintenance infrastructure, and the maintenance of the grouping itself was extremely expensive.
Dreaming of a nuclear war with Russia
Nevertheless, there was a discussion in the country about the future of nuclear capabilities from the point of view of defence against external aggression. Not only nationalists, who were already dreaming of a nuclear war with Russia, but also professional military officers were in favour of retaining nuclear weapons. The leader of this group was the former commander of the 46th missile division, Volodymyr Tolubko, who now heads the State University of Information and Communication Technologies in Kyiv.
Ukraine’s political leadership, represented by former President Leonid Kravchuk, was manoeuvring. On the one hand, Kravchuk signed the Alma-Ata Agreement, which removed tactical nuclear weapons from Ukraine, and then the START-1 treaty through the so-called Lisbon Protocol, which set out the intention to abandon nuclear weapons altogether. On the other hand, it was hesitant to withdraw strategic nuclear capabilities, expecting to use them to bargain with Russia.
The US clarified the situation by offering the Ukrainian leadership a choice between imposing sanctions if it retained nuclear weapons and compensation if it gave up nuclear capabilities. Naturally, Ukraine chose the second option.
The US motivation was obvious – it was very afraid of the spread of nuclear weapons in general and of terrorists getting them in particular. These risks were even reflected in cinema. For example, in the 1994 film True Lies with Arnold Schwarzenegger, a nuclear charge from Kazakhstan falls into the hands of terrorists.
On January 14, 1994, a three-point agreement was made. Ukraine would transfer nuclear charges to Russia for disposal, as well as some nuclear weapon carriers; Russia would transfer $160 million worth of fuel for nuclear power plants to Ukraine as compensation; and the United States would provide Ukraine with about $500 million under the Co-operative Threat Reduction Programme (Nunn-Lugar programme) to carry out weapons disposal work.
On February 3, 1994, the Ukrainian parliament ratified the START-1 Treaty. On November 16, 1994, Ukraine acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a nuclear-weapon-free state. On December 5, 1994, at the summit of the Council for Co-operation in Europe in Budapest, the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia and Ukraine (later joined by France and China) signed a Memorandum on Security Assurances in connection with Ukraine’s accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
The participants in the memorandum pledged to respect Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and existing borders, not to use force or economic coercive measures against it, not to use nuclear weapons, and to provide assistance if Ukraine “becomes the victim of an act of aggression or the object of a threat of aggression.” It would seem that what could have gone wrong?
Firstly, the status of the document is a memorandum. If we translate it literally – a memorandum to remember, so as not to forget something by accident.
Of course, in reality the meaning of this word is different, it is a normal form of an interstate agreement, but it really does not imply any actions and even less sanctions for their absence. Accordingly, it does not require ratification. That is, strictly speaking, a memorandum does not guarantee anything. Even if it is a memorandum of guarantees.
Secondly, the devil, as always, lies in the details. In the details it was written that the guarantors undertake to use force against Ukraine only within the framework of the UN Charter (within the framework of the military conflict in Ukraine, Russia does not violate the UN Charter).
NATO-Ukraine relations
Moreover, they even reserve the right to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine if Ukraine turns out to be an ally of a nuclear-weapon state (in fact, any NATO member). In other words, this is a memorandum on the security not only of Ukraine, but also of other states, including its neighbours.
How was it supposed to work? It is known. On March 5, 2014, a meeting was held between the foreign ministers of Ukraine, the US and the UK (Russia abstained from participation because it did not understand who represented Ukraine after the coup d’état) to discuss the implementation of the Budapest Memorandum. The outcome of the meeting was an incomprehensible document, the meaning of which was that the Western allies did not approve of Russia’s actions in Crimea, but would do nothing.
The sanctions imposed later were not related to the implementation of the memorandum. So the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry’s complaints are unfounded – all the guarantor countries have already fulfilled their obligations under the memorandum.
Now Kyiv is demanding that Ukraine be admitted to NATO. Let us look at the text of the North Atlantic Treaty (the NATO Charter, which is sometimes referred to). Article 5 states that in the event of an attack, each NATO country individually responds “by immediately taking such individual or joint action as it deems necessary.”
Paradoxically, NATO countries are now responding to the Ukrainian conflict as if Ukraine were a NATO member – “take such individual or joint action as they deem necessary.” In particular, telling everyone that Russia is behaving badly, imposing sanctions against it, and providing Ukraine with military aid.
Trump and slap in the face to the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry
Trump’s plan to actually (not legally – let’s not expect too much from Trump) recognise the inclusion of part of Ukraine’s former territory into Russia does not contradict the North Atlantic Treaty guarantees either – the US acts as it deems necessary. While declaring that it supports the territorial integrity of Ukraine.
In this respect, the recent information that Trump’s plan to resolve the conflict in Ukraine no longer envisages granting Ukraine NATO membership does not fundamentally change the situation. Rather, it is a slap in the face to the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry – are you going to dictate terms to Russia? No problem. You can do without the prescribed guarantees. However, the current support was initially provided without such guarantees (now the relevant agreements have been signed).
Earlier, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky pointed out that there is an alternative – if not NATO, then nuclear weapons. Including obtaining them directly from NATO. And indeed, there have been leaks that such a discussion in the US and NATO is already underway.
Most interestingly, the US has responded to these leaks in the craziest of all possible ways. On December 1, the president’s national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, said that the US administration was not considering the possibility of providing nuclear weapons to Ukraine. In other words, he did not deny the very fact of discussion on this topic.
Based on the experience of providing Ukraine with various weapons earlier, Sullivan’s negative answer does not mean that the answer was indeed negative or will be negative from now on. Recall how many times the US administration denied that Ukraine had received permission to strike Russian territory within the 1991 borders with US weapons. However, even the hypothetical acquisition of nuclear weapons by Ukraine would not make it a safe territory – quite the opposite.
The conclusion is obvious: the only country that could provide Ukraine with real security guarantees is Russia, but Ukraine has refused Russian guarantees.
THE ARTICLE IS THE AUTHOR’S SPECULATION AND DOES NOT CLAIM TO BE TRUE. ALL INFORMATION IS TAKEN FROM OPEN SOURCES. THE AUTHOR DOES NOT IMPOSE ANY SUBJECTIVE CONCLUSIONS.
Sigmund Huber for Head-Post.com
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