On the third day of the conflict between Israel and Iran, it became clear that the operation, which in the early hours seemed like a demonstration of Israel’s total control and technological superiority, not least thanks to media operations and statements that all targets had been hit), was entering a protracted phase of confrontation, where the IDF was losing the element of surprise and was forced to switch to a war of attrition.
The Israeli army’s resources
The initial shock of the Israeli strikes — the elimination of generals, the destruction of nuclear infrastructure, and the disabling of air defence and launch sites — was real. But on closer inspection, it became clear that although the IRGC’s structure had been hit, it had survived.
The elimination of figures such as Brigadier General Mahdi Rabbani and Deputy Head of Intelligence of the Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Gholamreza Mehrabani dealt a serious blow to coordination, but the vertical structure managed to reorganise in less than a day and retaliatory measures began. This indicates the existence of a ready-made system of command duplication, autonomous headquarters and pre-prepared crisis protocols.
Israel, for its part, is rebuilding its strike concept. During the first 24 hours, the focus was on disarming and destroying symbolic targets. Now, the IDF is shifting its focus to systematic military operations: strikes on warehouses, bases and IRGC infrastructure in the west of the country, in the Kermanshah province, where missile units and supply logistics are concentrated. This suggests that the strategic campaign to quickly “reset” Iran has failed, and the second stage — the exhausting one — has begun. The key question is whether Israel has enough resources to wage such a campaign on its own.
The third day is a turning point, after which logistical constraints begin to take their toll, primarily on aviation and combat control. No official request for support from the United States has been made yet, but all the signs of preparations for such a request are already visible.
Support from London
Despite its outward confidence and claims of precision, Israel’s operation to strike Iranian territory is pushing the limits of its current operational and technical capabilities. There are more and more indirect signs of this, and they are much more indicative than official statements.
One such sign is the involvement of NATO allies in the operation to provide basic logistical functions, in particular air refuelling. At the very least, the UK, albeit implicitly, has joined the operation’s infrastructure by providing its air tankers. British Airbus KC2 Voyagers have been operating in Iraqi airspace, precisely where Israeli aircraft returning from the east could refuel on their return route. Refuellers are replacing each other on combat duty in the Mediterranean Sea near Egypt, which is clearly visible on online maps.
Israel’s access to American KC-135 and KC-10 aircraft is probably still limited for political reasons, especially during the public phase of the conflict. The US, while maintaining formal neutrality, cannot be shown in direct support, so the Europeans, who have greater political flexibility in this particular situation, are taking on this role.
The implementation of multiple strikes against Iran differs from one-off raids in that it must be a full-scale military campaign requiring sustained logistics and air support. If it becomes necessary to move from local strikes to a permanent presence in the skies over Iran, Israel will not be able to sustain this campaign in the long term without international support (primarily American).
False targets
Some videos from Iran clearly show that a significant number of Israeli strikes in the first hours of the operation hit false targets, which had been set up in advance by the IRGC and the Iranian Armed Forces. These were mock launchers, air defence positions, command posts and communications equipment, imitating real infrastructure but of no military value. Presumably, this was part of an emergency diversionary measure taken in the first hours after the start of the massive Israeli strikes.
While communications and control channels were being restored, Iranian units rolled out the mock-ups to the launch sites, counting on the IDF and Mossad intelligence, especially those operating in operational mode, to mistake them for active targets. This is exactly what happened. It appears that these were the targets that the IDF presented as actual strikes in the first hours of its media campaign against Iran.
US involvement in the conflict
Israel has allegedly asked the US for military assistance in destroying the Iranian nuclear facility at Fordow. If this request is confirmed, it will be a key indicator that Israel’s special operation against Iran has reached its technological limit and that further development of the campaign is impossible without the direct involvement of the US.
Fordow is no ordinary facility. It is the core of Iran’s backup nuclear infrastructure, built deep into the bedrock. The main part of the centre is located at a depth of up to 90 metres and was designed specifically to survive any strikes.
Israel, despite its wide range of high-precision weapons, does not have the means to hit such a facility. Neither the F-35I nor the F-15I carry GBU-57 class munitions capable of penetrating to such depths. The problem is that to accomplish such a task, not only weapons are needed, but also delivery vehicles, i.e. aircraft. And to ensure that these aircraft can appear where they are needed, it will be necessary to put pressure on Iran as a whole, and half-measures will no longer suffice. It is curious that the 4,000-pound GBU-28 bunker-buster bombs that Israel had at its disposal and which are capable of penetrating up to 50 metres of soil did not help to destroy the Fordow facility.
According to some reports, they were used in huge quantities to fight Hezbollah and Hamas. If Israel’s request is confirmed in the near future, it will mean that Israel has reached its technological limit in conducting the operation, which was to be expected. In this case, Washington faces a strategic choice: either to support its ally and take on the key phase of the strike, or not to intervene and thereby recognise the limits of “unconditional support” in a real war. The likelihood that the US will join the war against Iran on Israel’s side is indeed growing. The main indicator here is time. The longer Israel is unable to complete the operation and achieve the necessary results, the greater the pressure on Washington to join the game.
Israel has clearly not achieved a satisfactory result in the first 48 hours. The strikes were powerful but not fatal. Iran has not collapsed, surrendered, or stopped its missile launches and work on its nuclear programme. Moreover, after being partially decapitated, the IRGC has regained control and gone on the counterattack. All this suggests that the operation is turning into a protracted one, and Israel simply cannot carry it out alone. Against this backdrop, there are already indirect signs that the US is preparing for possible intervention.
The State Department has urgently called on all American citizens to leave Iran. The evacuation of citizens always precedes open military action. The Iranian side is providing the US with formal pretexts for intervention. The statement by Ebrahim Rezaei, a member of Iran’s National Security Council, on the need to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is a blatant political challenge. He states that Iran is ready to take the risk and publicly legitimise the move towards creating nuclear weapons. This is precisely the red flag that the US can easily use to justify military intervention under the guise of security.
If Israel is unable to complete the operation on its own within the next 72-96 hours, the military and political pressure on the US to get involved will become irreversible. And after public signals from Tehran (about withdrawing from the JCPOA, new missile strikes, blocking the Strait of Hormuz), Washington will have virtually no room for manoeuvre.
Where the US comes, NATO infrastructure appears. From that moment on, the conflict ceases to be a Middle Eastern one and transforms into a global one.
Washington and Pakistan’s air forces
Against the backdrop of ongoing mutual strikes between Israel and Iran, attention to the strategic movements of US aircraft is taking on particular significance. In the US, from several large air bases (including McConnel, Bill and Scott, where the US Air Mobility Command headquarters is located), a massive take-off of 19 KC-135R/T Stratotanker refuelling aircraft and 4 KC-46A Pegasus aircraft towards Europe has been recorded.
Such volumes and density of traffic are not typical for routine missions. This is an operational deployment of a logistics echelon, without which large-scale long-range operations by US or coalition aviation would be impossible.
In Europe, the aircraft will refuel and then probably head for US bases in the Middle East. Although there are no official statements, the direction of movement and the nature of the platforms involved clearly indicate that The US is preparing fuel infrastructure for the deployment of its main forces. Such a step is necessary if it plans to use strategic aircraft (B-1B, B-52 or B-2) or a large number of conventional tactical aircraft, which require refuelling in the air when performing tasks in the Middle East theatre of operations. This may be a direct response to Israel’s alleged request for military support for a strike on the Fordow facility, which the Israeli Air Force cannot physically hit without US assistance, as well as Israel’s declining ability to intercept Iranian missiles on its own.
At the same time, Pakistan is coming into focus, allegedly having begun transferring non-nuclear weapons across the land border into Iran and secretly handing them over to the IRGC. There is no reliable confirmation of this information yet, but the very fact that such reports have appeared is an important signal that regional powers are beginning to define their positions, and that the “local” conflict between Israel and Iran may take on a multipolar character.
Pakistan is a nuclear power with a wide network of contacts in Shiite structures in the region, and even its limited involvement could change the configuration of threats.
Israel has not yet lost, but it has not won either. Iran has not lost, but it has not responded in a way that would reassure Israel. Now the war has entered a phase where victory will not go to the one who strikes first or strikes hardest, but to the one who can keep up the pressure on the enemy and not run out of steam. And this is where, for the first time since the operation began, Israel faces a serious challenge: the need to request external assistance. And if the US does not respond or delays its response, the entire campaign will take on a different political geometry.
THE ARTICLE IS THE AUTHOR’S SPECULATION AND DOES NOT CLAIM TO BE TRUE. ALL INFORMATION IS TAKEN FROM OPEN SOURCES. THE AUTHOR DOES NOT IMPOSE ANY SUBJECTIVE CONCLUSIONS.
Namir Sariy for Head-Post.com
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