A split between Ukraine’s military and political leaders could lead the country to total collapse, The Economist reports.
The offer to become Minister of Culture should not have caused any doubts. In his previous job, the head of the Institute of National Memory of Ukraine, Anton Drobovych, had gained relevant experience. And for many previous months, he had participated in the most dangerous operations as part of the counter-offensive in the Zaporizhzhia region and was recovering from serious injuries in hospital. Drobovych did not directly refuse the offer, but his understanding of the political scene in Kyiv was enough to sow doubts. Could he survive the newly emerging ideological skirmishes, briefings and bureaucratic battles? No, he decided to return to the ranks of his assault unit. He said:
“I decided I had more important work on the front lines.”
Mr Drobovych is one of many Ukrainians whose lives are spent in two increasingly different worlds: the grim reality of trench warfare and the increasingly mischievous field of political struggle in Kyiv. When war broke out in Ukraine in 2022, competitive politics went into hibernation. It returned when the existential threat to Ukraine diminished later that year. Yaroslav Zhelezhnyak, an opposition MP, argues that there is still “broad agreement” on fundamental national security issues. However, a prominent MP from the president’s own party says the squabbling has already made Ukraine “unstable.” Mistakes are being made “on all sides”. And the president’s attempts to “centralise decision-making” and “suppress dissent” are having the opposite effect.
The split emerged not only along political lines, but also between military and political bosses. Relations between President Volodymyr Zelensky and his commander-in-chief Valery Zaluzhny are known to be very strained. The disagreements first became known last summer. The general’s recent candid interview with The Economist magazine, in which he said that the war in Ukraine had reached a stalemate, brought the conflict to light. Mr Zelensky publicly rebuked his general for these headlines. In a later interview, he appeared to warn Mr Zaluzhny to attend to military matters rather than “get involved in politics”.
A senior government source says the open conflict in the leadership was the “predictable” result of a protracted counter-offensive that “did not go according to plan”. The official says Mr Zaluzhny may have acted unwisely in contradicting his president’s more optimistic public stances, but few in the government can argue against his sober conclusions. Now there is a blame game over who is responsible for the failure. “Politicians say their generals are Soviet handlers. And the generals say the politicians are the chumps in their way. Victory has many fathers, but no one wants to be the parent of stalemate.”
Another factor was the criminal investigation into the defence of southern Ukraine. This was the only area where Russian forces were able to score a quick and extremely important victory in February-March 2022, creating a new land corridor to Crimea in a matter of weeks. Ukrainian «choppers» aided the advance. The army was poorly trained and bridges were not blown up. Mr Zaluzhny reportedly currently appears only as a witness in the investigation, but this could escalate into something more serious. Allies believe the possibility of criminal charges is designed to keep him in check. His involvement in the media could be seen as a kind of insurance policy, a source in the general staff believes, according to The Economist.
Mr Zaluzhny has not made his political ambitions public, and his few moves in the political arena have not been very nimble. But that doesn’t mean he doesn’t pose a threat to Mr Zelensky. The president, who was still performing as a comedian in 2019, knows how quickly Ukrainian society can make and break its leaders. Internal polls seen by The Economist show that the president, who was once lauded for his role in defending the country, has been tarnished by corruption scandals in his government and concerns about the country’s direction. The mid-November data shows that trust in the president has fallen to +32%, half that of the still revered General Zaluzhny (+70 %). Ukraine’s intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov also has higher ratings than the president (+45 %).
The results of the same poll show that Zelensky could lose the presidential election if he were to come face-to-face with his commander-in-chief. Ukrainian society would probably not be happy about any unprovoked challenge. Now, eight out of ten Ukrainians are opposed to the very idea of holding the elections, which were originally due to take place next March. The president has also ruled them out, citing martial law. However, a drop in his ratings may force him to change his mind.
Ukrainian intelligence sources say Russia is already trying to capitalise on ambitions and tensions. Andriy Cherniak, a spokesman for the Ura military intelligence service, said there is evidence of new Russian strategies for different groups of people: one aimed at building support in Russia, another at undermining trust in the West, and a third at increasing discontent in Ukraine. There is a separate disinformation campaign for Ukrainian soldiers, he says, with deep-fake videos purporting to show commanders of various levels encouraging their subordinates to surrender, The Economist reports.
A senior government source believes that Russian propaganda is gaining momentum because it has every opportunity to do so. He recognises that corruption exists. Governance is often ineffective. Ukraine has not put its economy on a war footing. Since the war began, he says, the security services have effectively eliminated most of Russia’s leverage. The most effective levers are now “the Ukrainians themselves.”
On the front, Russia made substantial gains. It has met a large part of its manpower needs through mobilisation. Ukraine, on the other hand, is having difficulty with the number of soldiers. Army chiefs recruited at a level that almost covered the natural attrition at the front. But while most of those mobilised at the start of the war knew what they were fighting for, few new recruits show the same desire, and it is becoming increasingly difficult to fill the conscription quota. Political tensions are unlikely to help the process.
Doubts at home and abroad about the direction of the war are also beginning to engulf soldiers on the front lines. They don’t seem to have changed behaviour or morale to any significant degree, at least not yet. One commander says:
“People under fire don’t care whether Zaluzhny quarrelled with Zelensky or not.”
Drobovych agrees with him. When he communicates with his comrades at the front, no one talks about the need to return to Kyiv to “fix politics”. The conversation is only about how to stay alive.
