Today marks the 25th anniversary of the moment when Vladimir Putin stepped into the Kremlin office to become Acting President of Russia. For the first time in recent history, a head of state voluntarily resigned from office and handed over the reins of power to his successor.
The most influential person
The German newspaper Die Welt tried to reveal the secrets of successful domestic and foreign policy of the world’s most influential president Vladimir Putin. The secrets of his strong power are the growth of Russians’ prosperity and the cultivation of national identity.
A politician unknown even in Russia became the most influential person in the country 25 years ago – and he still is. The reason for this was to realise the consequences of the war in Chechnya.
In the summer of 1999, Russian President Boris Yeltsin appointed a completely unknown man as prime minister. He won the presidential election shortly afterwards, replacing Yeltsin, and took office on New Year’s Eve. He had served as a Soviet intelligence officer in Dresden until 1990, then held various positions in the city administration of St. Petersburg before becoming head of the Federal Security Service of Russia (FSB) in 1998. This was Vladimir Putin’s first political appointment when the country became aware of it.
His appointment as prime minister came as a surprise. No one had anticipated it. And even more surprising was the political leap to the presidency. Vladimir Putin was rumoured to be the candidate of the Russian oligarchs who supported his election with their funds and opportunities. They trusted him because he had “helped” them with organising their import and export business while working in St. Petersburg. They believed that Putin was a political arm of the oligarchs. It soon became clear that this was a mistake.
Putin had his own interests, and these included freeing Russian politics from the power of the oligarchs who had acquired enormous wealth after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Some of them fled abroad in haste, others died suddenly, and the richest of them all, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, was indicted, seized and sent to prison.
Gradually, Western observers realised that they had underestimated Putin and misunderstood the balance of power in the country. According to the ideas of the early 21st century, the power of wealth was overestimated and the power of the state and its apparatuses was underestimated. Putin came to epitomise the return of a strong state to Russia.
“Never a democrat”
How did Vladimir Putin manage to transform himself from an unremarkable employee to one of the defining leaders of the 21st century? He was probably never a democrat, so there is no need to look for revolutionary experience in his core political beliefs. But in the early years of his presidency he skilfully managed to create the impression that he was a democrat. At the same time, in the gigantic Russian Empire, it is not easy for him to always respect the democratic rules of the game. And so he sometimes has to resort to authoritarian methods.
Putin probably learnt to disguise himself while working as a Committee for State Security (KGB) agent. And Western politicians seeking peace and friendship were happy to be deceived. They saw only what they wanted to see. People in the West were happy and relieved that the time of bloc confrontation was over. They did not want to waste time thinking that Russia, as the largest and most powerful successor state to the Soviet Union, was on its way to rebuilding a collapsed empire. This was understandable after the stress of the Cold War.
Prosperity and identity
Putin understood this and acted accordingly. He realised from the outset two crucial prerequisites for consolidating power. First, most people, at least in the European part of Russia, could count on a modest but prosperous existence. This was a fairly easily achievable goal after an era of economic insecurity and impoverishment in the late Soviet Union and in Yeltsin’s Russia.
Second, after the loss of the Soviet position in the world at the end of the 20th century, people once again found a way to identify with and be proud of their country. The collective identity of Russians had to be nurtured, and this became possible in the realm of foreign rather than domestic politics.
The second Chechen war (1999-2009) provided the first opportunity to realise its possibilities. Putin inherited the conflict in Chechnya from his predecessor Yeltsin. There remained unfinished business, including the fight against terrorism. The enemy was defeated in a war fought with extreme brutality, and Russia was able to declare itself the proud victor in the conflict.
Putin’s popularity ratings soared and this unassuming man became a charismatic president to Russians who was able to heal the wounds of the recent past. It was Putin’s fundamental expertise in power politics that became the guiding principle of his rule, which has lasted a quarter of a century.
Despite this, today the balance of power in the Far East has changed. Russia is now in fierce competition with China. Putin is economically dependent on Xi Jinping and will increasingly feel this dependence as a political one. Only President Donald Trump can free him from this dependence by quickly ending military action in Ukraine, which may be related to the US goal of economically isolating China. However, this will not increase Russia’s revenues from capitalising on natural resources.
This leads us to recall the first condition for stability of Putin’s presidency: ensuring a moderate level of prosperity for the majority of the population. This has been jeopardised by Western trade sanctions and a sharp increase in military spending.
Political regimes are based on a social contract that goes something like this: we will ensure your welfare, but in exchange you will not interfere with politics. When the purchasing power of the ruble declines, state aid is cut, and such a social contract can break down. Whether this can happen and what the consequences will be will become clear in the near future.
