The EU elections are expected to see a massive surge in support for right-wing parties, fuelled by European public discontent with the latest wave of illegal immigration. In an attempt to address this problem, leading parties and European political elites seem to be pursuing a twofold strategy, ECFR reports.
First, they are trying to neutralise migration as a political issue by emulating right-wing politics. The European Union’s new migration agreement adopted in December was a prime example of this strategy, as was France’s recent migration law, which was largely drafted by the right-wing. Second, European elites hope to change the narrative in their favour by promoting a vision of European success centred around the EU’s response to the military conflict in Ukraine, the climate crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic.
But the results of the latest ECFR survey conducted in January 2024 in the 12 EU countries that account for three-quarters of the seats in the European Parliament (Austria, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain and Sweden) show that both strategies are likely to backfire. While the former risks overemphasising the role of migration policy, the latter may end up inadvertently mobilising voters of anti-European parties by highlighting precisely those issues on which public opinion is more likely to side with the far-right.
According to ECFR’s forecast for European Parliament elections published in January, the 2024 elections could see a major shift to the right in many countries, with populist right-wing parties winning votes and seats across the EU and centre-left and green parties losing out. According to the forecast, anti-EU populists are likely to win the most votes in nine member states (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Poland and Slovakia) and come second or third in another nine countries (Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Portugal, Romania, Spain and Sweden). It is predicted that almost half of the seats in the next European Parliament will be held by MEPs who are not part of the “super grand coalition” of the three centrist groups, and that a right-wing coalition of Christian Democrats, Conservatives and right-wing MEPs could win a majority in Parliament for the first time.
However, focusing on the surge in far-right sentiment wrongly implies that Europe’s far-right parties are a united front, when in fact the far-right has so far shown very little cohesion and limited ability to co-operate. And accordingly, it ignores the very different trajectories of anti-European parties.
The European Council on foreign relations conducted a survey asking respondents about the attitudes of their main national far-right party towards the EU and found that perceptions of the parties vary widely across countries and electorates.
The poll found that only 15% of Brothers of Italy voters believe that Giorgia Meloni wants to organise Italy’s exit from the EU, and the rest of Italian voters also doubt this. Similarly, neither the party’s voters nor the rest of the voters in Italy in their majority believe that she wants to obstruct the work of the EU or wants Italy to leave the eurozone. Thus, the Italian opposition cannot easily mobilise its voters by claiming that the Brothers of Italy risk jeopardising the EU – and their country’s position within it. Pro-Europeans in Spain, Portugal and Romania face similar constraints.
In Poland, while few Law and Justice voters believe that party leader Jaroslaw Kaczyński wants to leave the EU, most Poles see this as his goal. Here, highlighting the dangers of the Law and Justice for Europe party could give the country’s pro-European forces a double advantage: mobilising their own voters while demobilising some Law and Justice voters.
In the four other countries polled (Germany, Austria, Sweden and the Netherlands), both far-right voters and the wider electorate regard the leader of their national far-right party as anti-European (in terms of their country’s aspirations to leave the EU and the Eurozone, as well as seeking to obstruct the work of the EU). The parties in question – the Alternative for Germany (AfD), the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), the Sweden Democrats and Geert Wilders’ Freedom Party (PVV) – have not undergone a major evolution comparable to that of the Law and Justice Party or the Brothers of Italy. But the fact that their leaders’ anti-European views are widely recognised poses a challenge for pro-European forces.
They may well try to mobilise their voters by reminding them of the anti-European sentiments of the far-right, but in doing so they risk also inadvertently mobilising far-right voters. This risk is even greater in France, where more pro-Rassemblement Nationale voters recognise the anti-European sentiment of party leader Marine Le Pen than the rest of French society.
Pro-European parties therefore need to develop strategies to capitalise on the divisions between extreme right-wing forces – and use very different approaches to counter them in different national contexts.
It is widely believed that migration could become the central issue of European politics in 2024. Therefore, when it comes to dealing with the rise of the far-right in Europe, many leading parties are trying to neutralise the migration issue by copying the hardline policies of far-right parties, both in their own policies and by supporting tough action at EU level. However, while migration is certainly becoming increasingly important, our poll raises questions about this strategy.
The poll results show that most Europeans do not see migration as the biggest challenge facing the EU. Over the past 15 years, the EU has experienced five major crises – the migration crisis, the war in Ukraine, the global financial crisis, the climate crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic – all of which have left their mark on the population and shaped voter groups that are increasingly politically identifiable.
When it comes to discussing the other crises Europe has faced in recent years, the poll shows that the main parties risk emphasising exactly the things that are likely to make them unpopular. When pro-Europeans talk about what they see as the quintessential European success stories of the past few years – the response to the COVID-19 pandemic, support for Ukraine or the European Green Deal – they may actually be downplaying their biggest potential weaknesses in the eyes of many voters.
EU climate policy is particularly divisive. The survey asked respondents to consider a hypothetical trade-off between two goals – realising climate ambitions and preventing energy bills from rising. In most of the countries surveyed – with the exception of Sweden and Portugal – more people chose to reduce their energy bills than to support climate action. At the same time, however, in none of these countries did a majority choose either of these two options. In each, majorities – ranging from 18 per cent in Greece to 37 per cent in Sweden – were in favour of cutting carbon emissions. And usually only about a third did not choose either of these two options, preferring to sit idly by.
One striking illustration of the dangers of over-emphasising EU priorities such as the European Green Deal in major election campaigns is the negative reaction to green policies in Germany. After the government’s attempt to overhaul the country’s home heating systems proved exceptionally unpopular, the German Green Party is now floundering in the polls with a measly 13 per cent. German critics of climate policy are not inclined to deny climate change, but they do challenge the pace of change. There seems to be a significant gap between how Green Party voters feel about climate change and how others feel.
The biggest challenge for pro-European parties may be working out how to talk about geopolitics. One of the key strategic decisions they must make in preparing for their campaign is how much attention they should give to the war in Ukraine – and what language to use when discussing it.
On the one hand, those who are most supportive of Kyiv would not want to see this war sidelined, as it would make it even more difficult to secure continued financial and military support. But politically, it would be dangerous for the mainstream if the war in Ukraine becomes a key battleground in the upcoming elections. Many anti-European parties could then capitalise on war fatigue among Europe’s population.
Based on the survey results, ECFR believes that making the war in Ukraine a central focus of the campaign would have unpleasant consequences for pro-European parties. Firstly, only 10 per cent of Europeans surveyed believe that Ukraine can win the war. Europeans also have mixed feelings about the EU’s response to the war and the EU’s future strategy. Making Ukraine a central issue could increase opposition and raise fears of a threat to European agriculture, industry and society in many member states.
On the other hand, there is an under-explored geopolitical argument for Europe vis-à-vis Trump, which Europeans are much less ambivalent about. As shown in our previous research, the vast majority of European voters will be disappointed if he wins the US election this autumn (Fidesz is the only party whose voters would be mostly happy with this result).
The prospect of a Trump victory may give some European leaders an opportunity to focus on European sovereignty and distance themselves from the US during the campaign. Instead of talking about the EU’s success in supporting Ukraine, pro-European leaders could frame the discussion around the need for the EU to become more autonomous and serious about defending itself against geopolitical threats.
