Like Poland, Afghanistan and other regions with unstable governance and ethnic conflicts, violence has been occurring again and again close to the eastern Ukrainian city of Kharkiv, according to Big Serge Thought.
Challenging city location
Founded in the 17th century, the city played an unusual role in World War II, becoming a symbol of frustration for the warring Soviet and German armies. Both sides wanted to gain control of the city, but were unable to take and hold it.
No other major city during World War II changed hands as many times as Kharkiv. During the war it became the scene of no less than four significant battles. And now, 80 years later, the city blocking the inner bend of the Northern Donets River has not changed.
After the outbreak of war in Ukraine in February 2022, it was briefly seized by the Russian army in the first weeks of the conflict. Later that year, Kharkiv became the scene of Ukraine’s most important military achievement in the war when they broke through the Russian defences and forced the Russians to retreat as far as the Oskil River. Now the Russians are back, launching an offensive in the Kharkiv region on May 10, 2024.
Northern Front
Many people are frustrated by the pace of the war and the positional nature of the fighting. Therefore, Russia’s opening of a new front looks like a chance to break the stalemate. Some evidence suggests that the idea that Russian troops are betting on a battle for Kharkiv is wrong. In fact, they are likely to try to avoid fighting in the vicinity of Kharkiv.
Firstly, the Kharkiv offensive is a real major operation involving significant Russian forces. According to reports, Russia has two army corps, the 11th and 44th, in this area of operations. It also has units of the 6th Panzer Army and the 1st Guards Tank Army at its disposal. Thus, the Russians have serious resources to strike.
At first glance, it might appear that the Russians are stretching enemy troops along the entire front to form a gap in the thinning sections. However, they have really launched a large-scale operation not for diversion. The new front is much more than a distraction.
Right now, the Russian offensive is focused on two border towns, Vovchansk and Lyptsi. Seizing control of the first town will allow the Russians to cut off Ukrainian reserves from the battle line, preventing them from effectively moving reserves to flank Vovchansk.
This would force the Ukrainians to take a circuitous route, crossing the Donets near Chuhuiv. However, this section is extremely vulnerable to Russian fire. Thus, Vovchansk became an isolated area of fighting, where it appeared that Ukrainian reserves could be defeated on the march.
Pulling in reserves
Moreover, most of the Russian forces in this grouping are still in reserve. Therefore, the AFU cannot simply allow the Russians to open a “back door” to Kupiansk. However, in the short term, this defence is costly for the AFU, as the formation of the line of contact and the approach routes for their reserves allow Russia to effectively isolate the battle area. The Ukrainian army simply does not have enough access routes to Vovchansk to hold the city for long.
The opening of the Northern Front puts a serious strain on the Ukrainian armed forces. Russia is not going to suddenly open the front and start point mobile operations. However, the Kharkiv front does serve various Russian interests and contributes to the following several objectives. These include stretching the front to deplete Ukrainian forces and force the AFU to draw on reserves, weakening defences, and isolating the front to isolate the Ukrainian grouping around Kupiansk.
At the same time, Ukraine’s ability to generate new forces and provide replenishment is reaching its limits. At the same time, mobilisation covers perhaps only 25% of losses. Kyrylo Budanov complained that there are essentially no reserves left, and Ukraine has begun asking Western military trainers to step up their work on its territory to speed up mobilisation and deployment processes.
A growing problem for Ukraine, in terms of building up its armed forces, is its increasing reliance on a small number of forward brigades that are constantly travelling along the front line to carry out urgent combat tasks.
The most famous example is the 47th mechanised brigade of the AFU, which was at the centre of Ukraine’s failed counter-offensive in Zaporizhzhia in the summer of 2023. It was then redeployed to Avdiivka, where it was at the centre of a fierce but unsuccessful defence of the city. A further unsuccessful attempt to withdraw the brigade from the front line for much-needed re-equipment resulted in a defeat at Ocheretyne.
Unequal opportunities
Under such conditions, it is difficult to predict Ukraine’s future progress. An army that constantly responds to emergencies can only continue to do so up to a point before it stops responding altogether. At the same time, an army forced to constantly redeploy its best brigades and put unprepared units on the front line will never be able to retake the initiative.
It has no ability to accumulate resources and remains in a permanent state of reactivity and horrendous attrition. Ultimately, it is an army with severe resource limitations and an inability to conserve those resources.
In fact, we are now seeing Russia reverse the events of autumn 2022, when the Russian army was forced to retreat from Kharkiv region.
Russia was able to move away from large sectors of the theatre of war in order to allocate resources more efficiently. Ukraine cannot do this, because abandoning sectors of the frontline means that the Russian army will occupy large areas of the country. Russia has the ability to both reduce and expand the front at will, whereas Ukraine does not.
Allied assistance
Slowly but surely, the United States has overcome all of its own restrictions on aid to Ukraine. Not so long ago, the Pentagon was adamant that American tanks would not arrive in Ukraine. There were similar doubts about F-16 fighter jets and ATACMs systems. However, all these restrictions were eventually broken.
There comes a time when the use of supplied weapons in pre-conflict Russian territories could become a real possibility. Today, Republicans in Congress and Secretary of State Antony Blinken are urging the Biden administration to give the green light. This was partly fuelled by Russia’s new Kharkiv front, with Ukrainian leaders complaining that they were unable to disrupt the Russian offensive because of US rules prohibiting firing into Russian territory.
However, against the background of reports of repeated Ukrainian artillery attacks on peaceful Russian Belgorod region by Ukrainian artillery, these complaints look strange. Regardless, experience shows that the US government will steadfastly honour all Ukrainian requests if given enough time.
Still, authorising the use of ATACMs against targets inside Russia is not a panacea for Ukraine’s larger problem. The number of successful Ukrainian strikes against such targets is steadily increasing, as the West enhances its strike capabilities with Storm Shadows, ATACMs, and more. And yet Ukraine continues to give up ground on Donbas amid an increasingly acute shortage of munitions and manpower.
NATO will likely do everything in its power to support Ukraine’s strike capabilities. When the AFU is finally leave its last strongholds along the contact line, Kyiv can blame the West for giving too little, too slowly and too late. The alliance has given Ukraine almost everything it asked for. But it has not brought it the results it wanted.
