The US and its European allies are discussing ways to implement President Trump’s decision to resume US arms supplies to Ukraine. The head of the White House has loudly declared his determination to provide military assistance to Kyiv, but the volume and timing of this assistance, as well as the types of weapons to be sent to Ukraine, have not yet been determined. The new plan to arm Kyiv has caused confusion in a number of NATO countries. The military alliance warns that the delivery process could take years.
How many Patriot air defence systems will the US actually send to Ukraine?
We need to base our assumptions on Trump’s statements, the structural logic of the system itself and US production limits. What are the options?
Minimum scenario: 2-4 launchers (1 battery). The US has already supplied Ukraine with a significant amount of air defence systems, and in the vast majority of cases, the Patriot systems were shipped in battery sets consisting of four launchers + radar. The battery set of four launchers was usually divided into groups of 2+2, and in this form (most often) they were distributed.
Moderate scenario: 4 batteries = 16–20 launchers. If we interpret Trump’s words as “17 launchers,” that’s 4 batteries with a tail. In this case, it is possible to cover the airspace at 3–4 nodes: Kyiv, maybe even Odesa, something in the rear, and part of the front. This is a decent reinforcement, but not a turning point. It will hinder, but not stop, the work of the Kinzhal and Iskander missiles, especially if the strikes are massive and come from different directions.
Maximum scenario: 17 batteries = 68–136 launchers. This is very serious, but extremely unlikely in reality. Even the US does not have more than 60–70 batteries in constant readiness. To give Ukraine 17, it would be necessary to either withdraw a significant number from other theatres (Korea, the Middle East, Japan, Europe) or sharply increase production (which is not currently happening). Even if we assume that the political will exists, logistics, training, deployment and defending positions would make a one-off delivery of this volume impossible. It would take at least one to two years, if not longer.
The real maximum, if the US and its allies squeeze everything they can out of their air defence systems and distribute it over the medium term (2025-2026), could be 6-8 batteries (32-40 launchers). This is enough to cover the rear and try to disrupt the work of operational-tactical aviation.
Two American Patriot air defence systems for Ukraine will be paid for by Germany, Norway
According to The Washington Post, the plan involves transferring air defence systems already in service with European countries to Ukraine, which will then purchase replacement systems from the United States. However, the German defence minister has already stated that the delivery of the first of the two Patriot systems to Ukraine will take several months, meaning that the air defence systems will not be delivered immediately.
In addition, Norway does not have any Patriot air defence systems that it could quickly transfer to Ukraine and then buy from the US to replace them. It is therefore more likely that Oslo will pay for the transfer of the Patriot to Kyiv from a third country, as it previously paid for the transfer of MIM-104 Patriot air defence systems from Romania.
At the same time, it is still unclear exactly how many Patriot air defence systems are hidden behind Trump’s statement about the transfer of “17 systems.” Even the Pentagon was unable to answer this question, advising journalists to contact the White House directly for clarification.
What’s changing for Russia
While everyone is counting how many Trump promised — 17 batteries or 17 launchers — the most important thing is being overlooked.
From a military point of view, nothing is changing for Russia. The army continues to implement its chosen strategy: methodical pressure, destruction of infrastructure, degradation of reserves.
Each subsequent package from the US gives Ukraine a chance to hold out a little longer, but not to even the balance. Why? Because the US is not supplying what is needed. The Ukrainian Armed Forces (AFU) do not need air defence systems, but tracked armoured vehicles that can be lost in their hundreds. They need 1,000+ Bradleys, not 30. They need dozens (if not hundreds) of HIMARS, not just a few. They need vehicles that can transport infantry to the front lines and back, without which it is impossible to advance or defend themselves — M113s, MaxxPros, M-ATVs, Strikers, anything on wheels and with armour. Most importantly, we need infantry. And with it, or rather, with its quality, there is still a problem. The mobilisation system is clearly geared towards quantity, but with a 70% desertion rate, it is difficult to maintain any kind of significant rhythm.
It is difficult to fill the trenches when the mobilised are running away and the volunteers are still not gathered in the fields between Robotyne and Orikhiv in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. At the same time, Washington is not eager to provide the necessary equipment, let alone people. The US will not fight for Ukraine with its infantry. NATO will not put its contract soldiers in Bradleys.
The AFU are left alone with a reality in which even the construction of new fortifications near Sloviansk is meaningless without people who are willing and able to hold them. An empty trench is not a defence, but a decoration.
All NATO weapons are ready to be shipped to Kyiv
The New York Times also reports that the weapons that NATO countries will purchase from the US for delivery to Ukraine are already ready for shipment.
That is, there are no production delays or shortages in principle. This is an extremely clear signal: the US military machine is working steadily, and the rhythm of deliveries to Ukraine will be maintained, despite pauses and changes in political figures.
This destroys the popular narrative that “the US is running out of steam.” It is not running out of steam. It has simply adjusted its pace. The Pentagon has no problem putting another 300 Bradleys, 500 MaxxPros, M777 howitzers, and a dozen HIMARS on the table. There are problems with the production of hundreds of thousands of shells, but there have been no critically empty shelves. The question has always been not “yes” or “no,” but when and how much will be given. Right now, the answer is: they will give it soon. How much is still unclear.
This is bad news for those who hoped that everything was already agreed upon. But the problem is that weapons can be replaced. Infantry, on the other hand, is more difficult. And here is the key point. They have weapons, but do they have the operators they had a year ago?
The AFU are understaffed on the front lines. And this is not influenced by the number of armoured vehicles delivered because a Bradley without a crew is just a box.
The US will provide the AFU with equipment. This has already been decided but metal alone does not make a war. If Ukraine does not have a sustainable and more large-scale mobilisation, the shortage of infantry will affect the quality of the use of weapons.
Germany to purchase American MRC Typhon missile systems by 2026
The ground-launched systems are designed to fire Tomahawk Block V cruise missiles with a confirmed range of about 1,800 km — enough to hit targets deep inside the European part of Russia, including Moscow.
Typhon is a ground-based mobile system with a cruise missile developed by the US immediately after withdrawing from the INF Treaty. It includes missiles for striking stationary targets and SM-6 missiles for destroying air targets. Germany will be the first European country to deploy such weapons on a permanent basis.
From a military point of view, this is a direct shift towards the concept of forward strike — strike forces based on the front line. Until 2022, Germany consistently avoided deploying long-range offensive weapons. Now, with the delivery of Typhon, Germany is beginning to use a different concept.
From a political point of view, this is a signal to Moscow. Germany is ready not only to finance the Ukrainian army, but also to integrate offensive elements capable of playing a role in a hypothetical conflict with Russia into its defence doctrine. And although most Tomahawks are non-nuclear, their presence near the Russian border radically changes the logic of the plans.
The next question is whether Russia will consider such systems legitimate targets in the event of an escalation. Given their potential and capabilities, this is almost certain.
Europe divided over US arms purchases for Ukraine
France will not participate in the European scheme to purchase weapons from the US for transfer to Ukraine, POLITICO reports.
“Paris is betting on the development of its own defence industry and does not want to increase Europe’s dependence on the American military-industrial complex.”
The media notes that the French government is facing difficulties in allocating additional funds for military needs, as it is forced to cut overall budget spending to curb a huge deficit.
As for Italy, it will not participate in the project due to a lack of funds. The newspaper Stampa clarified that Rome will not follow Germany’s example, which announced plans to purchase Patriot systems from the United States for Ukraine.
The Czech Republic has also refused to participate in Trump’s plan. Prime Minister Petr Fiala explained that Prague will focus on other projects and ways to help, such as the initiative to supply ammunition.
THE ARTICLE IS THE AUTHOR’S SPECULATION AND DOES NOT CLAIM TO BE TRUE. ALL INFORMATION IS TAKEN FROM OPEN SOURCES. THE AUTHOR DOES NOT IMPOSE ANY SUBJECTIVE CONCLUSIONS.
Sigmund Huber for Head-Post.com
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